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ANTITHEATRICALITY AND 
IRRATIONALITY: AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW
Kent R. Lehnhof
Over the last three decades, antitheatrical authors like Stephen Gosson, 
Phillip Stubbes, and William Prynne have become increasingly visible in 
the literary and cultural studies of the early modern period. Even so, the 
tendency has been to treat these authors as ideological extremists: reaction-
ary hacks whose opposition to stage plays originates in outrageous ideas of 
the self, impossible notions of right and wrong, and bizarre beliefs about 
humanity’s susceptibility to external suggestion. This characterization can 
be traced back to several of the pioneering studies in the field, including 
Jonas Barish’s The Antitheatrical Prejudice (1985) and Laura Levine’s Men 
in Women’s Clothing (1994), each of which takes the irrationality of the anti-
theatricalists as a starting point, as well as a structuring assumption. Both of 
these books have shaped our critical discourse: virtually everyone who has 
written about antitheatricalism in recent years has been influenced by and 
is indebted to the readings that these books  present.1 Nevertheless, I believe 
that these groundbreaking studies plowed the field in such a way as to distort 
some of its contours. In the present essay, I offer a careful response in hopes 
of giving us a better sense of the lay of the land.
While it might seem misguided or querulous of me to critique these 
works in close detail, it is not my intent to deny or disparage their impor-
tant contributions to the discipline. Indeed, it is precisely because these 
books have been so influential that a response is worthwhile. My aim in 
reviewing their claims is to cast light on our collective tendency to mis-
construe the antitheatricalists’ meaning, which in turn keeps us from 
appreciating what early modern antitheatrical debates are all about. It 
is simply not the case that the antitheatricalists attack the stage because 
they have outlandish beliefs about the self, while the apologists defend 
it because they have well-considered ones. In point of fact, the concep-
tualization of human nature that informs the antitheatrical tracts is rec-
ognizably Protestant and culturally dominant in early modern England. 
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Nevertheless, we often ignore this orthodoxy to emphasize instead what 
seems illogical or eccentric. In doing so, we oversimplify a complex 
 sociocultural situation and turn antitheatrical discourse into a cartoonish 
version of itself. In what follows, I seek to paint a more telling portrait by 
showing how this assumption of irrationality has colored our criticism, 
causing us to miss many of the qualifications, clarifications, and theori-
zations that make antitheatrical writings more compelling than we give 
them credit for being. The antitheatricalists are not as senseless as we have 
supposed, and their writings can give us real insight into the acute moral 
and ethical problems posed by playmaking in early modern England, as 
well as an ampler sense of the operation, influence, and significance of the 
professional stage.
*           *           *
As one of the seminal studies in the field, Barish’s The Antitheatrical 
Prejudice is remarkable in a number of ways. Its scope is impressive (rang-
ing from antiquity to modernity), and its erudition is simply astound-
ing. Nevertheless, the material that Barish chooses to present and the 
manner in which he does so leave little doubt that we are meant to see 
the antitheatricalists as incoherent and illogical. In the case of the early 
modern moment, this is done by paying disproportionate attention to 
William Prynne, the most ardent of all the English polemicists. Though 
Barish readily admits that Prynne is an exceptional figure—not so much 
an example of antitheatrical thought as a grotesque caricature of it—he 
nevertheless turns to Prynne again and again to represent the antitheatri-
cal position. Indeed, the chapter in Barish’s book that focuses on the early 
modern English controversy (“Puritans and Proteans”) quotes Prynne 
four times as frequently as any other author.2
This quotational bias makes for interesting reading (since Prynne’s 
tone and style are nothing if not striking), but it ultimately encourages us 
to think of the whole of antitheatrical ideology in terms of Prynne’s par-
ticular intemperance, as if the extreme were the mean. This has the effect 
of undermining the enterprise—an effect that Barish only  intensifies by 
making pseudoscientific claims about Prynne’s mental condition. for 
even as Barish makes Prynne out to be the model of the antitheatrical 
movement, he labels the man a “megalomaniac” and describes his excur-
sus against the stage as “a logorrhaeic nightmare” and “an exercise in 
pathology.”3 According to Barish, no one would even consider  writing a 
text like Prynne’s Histrio-mastix (1632) unless he was trying to “to work 
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off a staggering load of resentment and anxiety.” Histrio-mastix is, Barish 
advises, the work of one who is “terrified, maddened, by the fear of total 
breakdown” (87). By placing Prynne’s writings within such a frame, 
Barish shifts the focus from antitheatricalism per se to the neuroses from 
which it is supposed to spring. By treating every statement as a symptom 
of some deeper disturbance, Barish renders Prynne’s actual objections 
irrelevant: the ravings of a troubled mind. Such an approach is patently 
prejudicial. One can only wonder how close we are coming to an accurate 
understanding of the antitheatrical movement when Barish is filtering 
all of it to us through the life and writings of one whom he alleges to be 
either insane or possessed: “goaded by a devil,” as Barish writes, “. . . to 
blacken the theater with lunatic exaggeration” (87).
When treating antitheatrical authors other than Prynne, Barish is not 
as heavy-handed, but he continues to suggest that they should not be taken 
seriously. After pointing out, for instance, that Stephen Gosson faults 
players for violating the Deuteronomic prohibition against men wear-
ing women’s garments, Barish writes, “Like other antitheatricalists .  .  ., 
Gosson stubbornly overlooks the long tradition according to which a num-
ber of female saints, in apostolic days, dressed as men in order to escape 
their persecutors” (90). By claiming that Gosson “stubbornly  overlooks” this 
tradition, Barish implies that Gosson argues in bad faith, willfully omitting 
important information. Yet Barish nowhere establishes that an early mod-
ern Protestant like Gosson would have known about or approved of these 
cross-dressed saints from the first century. furthermore, Barish glosses over 
the fact that historical examples of women dressing as men does not exactly 
authorize men to dress as women—especially when they do so not to pre-
serve their lives but to please their paying  customers. Nevertheless, Barish’s 
insinuation here, as elsewhere, is that the antitheatricalists are untrust-
worthy. To argue as they do, one must either be either mentally imbalanced 
(like Prynne) or intellectually dishonest (like Gosson).
Of course, Barish is not exactly enamored of the early modern apolo-
gists, either. He describes Thomas Heywood as “spectacularly inept” and 
savages his Apology for Actors (1612) as an “extraordinarily thoughtless 
piece of polemic” (119, 118). Of this treatise, Barish claims, “It would be 
hard to imagine a more inept ‘apology.’ . . . Heywood’s bungling is such 
that he is constantly thrusting weapons into the hands of his  adversaries” 
(119–20). However, it must be noted that the pejoratives applied to 
Heywood are of a different order than those applied to the antitheatri-
calists. Whereas Prynne was insane, Heywood was simply incompetent. 
And by portraying Heywood as ham-fisted rather than hysterical, Barish 
implies that the case to be made for the theater is perfectly reasonable and 
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coherent. The only reason Heywood cannot pull it off is because he is 
“slack,” “desultory,” “artless,” and “clumsy” (117, 118, 121).
Throughout The Antitheatrical Prejudice, then, Barish treats antitheat-
ricalism as precisely that—a prejudice. This assumption, however, does 
us no favors. When we tell ourselves the antitheatricalists are irrational, 
we tend to read them ungenerously, which causes us to misconstrue their 
meaning. We can see this happening throughout Levine’s Men in Women’s 
Clothing. When Levine, for instance, writes about the pamphlets of 
Stephen Gosson, she describes them as eliding all forms of human agency. 
According to Levine, Gosson’s pamphlets portray humanity as alto-
gether lacking in will or volition—robots who have been programmed to 
respond automatically to external stimuli:
Gosson’s view of human behavior implies a kind of 
“ domino theory” of the self. Human behavior is a chain of 
degenerative action in which each act leads automatically to 
the next—(“from pyping to playing, from play to pleasure, 
from pleasure to slouth, from slouth to sleepe, from sleepe 
to sinne, from sinne to death, from death to the Divel”). 
Each action mechanically triggers the next without will 
or volition. In fact it is as if the will has been permanently 
 disarmed, rendered inoperative.4
Yet the individual will that Gosson is supposed to disregard is right there 
in the quoted passage. It’s just that Levine breaks it off before it has 
time to appear. If we read Gosson’s sentence all the way to the end, we 
see that he makes the whole process of “preferment” conditional upon 
our consent:
[Poetry] preferres you too Pyping, from Pyping to playing, 
from play to pleasure, from pleasure to slouth, from slouth 
too sleepe, from sleepe too sinne, from sinne to death, from 
death to the deuill, if you take your learning apace, and passe 
through euery forme without reuolting.5
Though Gosson envisions seduction as a slippery slope, he not only allows 
but also encourages us to resist or “revolt.” Contrary to the claim that 
agency is inoperative in his account, Gosson grants us power—at any 
point in the process—to dig in our heels and arrest our descent.
This might seem like a small thing, but it attests to our collective ten-
dency to sensationalize antitheatrical discourse at the same time that it 
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illustrates how this tendency can take us off track. In Men in Women’s 
Clothing, this inclination is pervasive, manifesting itself in the first para-
graph of the first chapter. This paragraph (which also serves as the book’s 
blurb) generates considerable energy and interest by alleging an escala-
tion or intensification in antitheatrical discourse over time:
Sometime in 1579, in a pamphlet which was to establish the 
terms of attack and defense for another sixty years, Stephen 
Gosson made the curious remark that theater “effeminated” 
the mind. four years later, in a pamphlet twice the size, 
Phillip Stubbes clarified this claim even as he heightened 
it by insisting that male actors who wore women’s clothing 
could literally “adulterate” male gender. fifty years later in 
a one-thousand-page tract which may have hastened the 
closing of the theatres, William Prynne described a man 
whom women’s clothing had literally caused to “degener-
ate” into a woman. In the years of mounting pamphlet war 
about the stage, the vague sense that theater could some-
how soften the responses of the audience had been replaced 
by the fear—expressed in virtually biological terms—that 
theatre could structurally transform men into women. 
(10, my emphasis)
What this escalation ostensibly reveals is the irrationality of the enter-
prise: the antitheatricalists allow their anxieties to spiral out of control 
until they are making incredible claims about the playhouse’s power to 
transform men into women, quite literally turning penises into vaginas. 
This particular escalation, however, is more an effect of Levine’s rhetoric 
than it is Gosson’s or Stubbes’s or Prynne’s. As my italics aim to show, 
Levine creates a sense of intensification by placing the word “literally” 
before the word pulled from Stubbes and the word pulled from Prynne. 
Were it not for this adverb, there is little in the sequence effeminate → 
adulterate → degenerate that would point us in the direction of increasing 
literality. It only does so in Levine’s text because she modifies the last two 
terms. When these terms are returned to context, however, we find that 
they do not really carry the weight of literality that Levine would have 
them bear.
The relevant passage in the Stubbes text, which glances at the practice 
of using boy actors to impersonate women, focuses on apparel, not anat-
omy. “Our Apparel,” Stubbes writes, “was giuen vs as a signe distinctiue 
to discern betwixt sex and sex, & therefore [for] one to weare the Apparel 
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of another sex, is to participate with the same, and to adulterate the veritie 
of his owne kinde.”6 Since the thing that is said to be adulterated here—
namely, “verity,” or truth—is so abstract, it is difficult to read this passage 
“in virtually biological terms.” Unless we agree that for Stubbes the “truth 
of mankind” is a penis, we are hard-pressed to interpret this statement 
anatomically, as an escalation of Gosson’s anxieties.7
Similarly, the degeneration discussed by Prynne does not lend itself 
to a literal reading. As with Stubbes, the term appears in a complaint 
about cross-dressing. It is evident, though, that Prynne’s attention is on 
the accoutrements of gender, not its genital structures. In the process of 
describing the degeneration of the misattired man, Prynne refers to cloth-
ing, footwear, gait, and voice—none of which comprises the anatomical 
transformation we have been led to expect:
Doth not that valiant man, that man of courage who is 
admirable in his armes, and formidable to his enemies 
degenerate into a woman with his veiled face? he lets his 
coate hange downe to his ankles, he twists a girdle about his 
breast, he puts on women’s shoes, and after the manner of 
women, he puts a cawle upon his head; moreover he carries 
about a distaffe with wooll, and drawes out a thred with his 
right hand, wherewith he hath formerly borne a trophie, 
and he extenuateth his spirit and voyce into a shriller and 
womanish sound.8
While it is true that Prynne sees the cross-dressed man as assuming 
the manners and mannerisms of a woman, this is not the same thing as 
becoming one in a biological or structural sense. Like Stubbes before him, 
Prynne is clearly anxious about effeminization, but Levine misrepresents 
these concerns when she makes them more literal (and therefore more 
outlandish) than they really are.
As an alternative to Levine’s literalistic approach, we would do well 
to consider a number of more recent studies showing that sexually coded 
language in early modern usage often has more to do with morality than 
with morphology. Gina Hausknecht, for instance, has demonstrated that 
even as John Milton uses gendered terms like “manly” and “masculine” 
in his prose writings to refer to those who are committed to Christian lib-
erty and civic virtue, he does so without any especial regard for anatomy. 
Men can be insufficiently masculine, and women are not precluded from 
assuming “masculine” moral positions. Accordingly, Milton’s discourse 
of manliness should not be taken literally: it is “about the mind, and very 
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specifically not about the body.”9 I propose that the same is generally true 
of authors like Gosson, Stubbes, and Prynne. Before we adopt an anato-
mistic interpretation of their fears of effeminization, we should remember 
that antitheatricalism is first and foremost an ethical discourse. As such, 
its primary frame of reference is not material but moral. Consequently, 
when antitheatrical authors use words like “effeminization,” “adultera-
tion,” and “degeneration,” it is far more likely that they are referring to 
a process of spiritual corruption whereby virtue is turned to vice than 
they are a process of genital transformation in which penises are turned 
into vaginas. The latter process may be fantastical, but the former is not 
hard to imagine at all. One need not abandon logic to think that a lascivi-
ous interlude might induce an otherwise upright individual to slacken his 
(or her) “manly” temperance and slide into “womanish” lust. As soon as 
we entertain the idea that the antitheatricalists’ rhetoric of manliness and 
effeminateness refers to moral postures more than genital structures, much 
of their much-noted irrationality evaporates.
If we persist, however, in reading antitheatrical discourse pathologi-
cally, we cannot help but come to imperfect conclusions, as Levine does 
when she decides that the subjective model set forth in the antitheatri-
cal tracts is profoundly contradictory. Levine reaches this verdict after 
observing that antitheatrical authors maintain—at one and the same 
time—that the self is
1. fixed and stable
2. Pliant and susceptible
3. Inherently womanish
4. Inherently monstrous and beastly
5. Inherently empty
Taking these various alternatives to be mutually exclusive, Levine inter-
prets their copresence in antitheatrical discourse as evidence of its under-
lying irrationality, yet this alleged incoherence is more illusory than 
actual, as becomes clear when we put pressure on points 1 and 2. Though 
Levine claims that the antitheatricalists contradict themselves by suggest-
ing that the self is simultaneously stable and susceptible, these authors 
do not describe the self as being stable or fixed. They routinely affirm, 
as Prynne does in Histrio-mastix, that God has apportioned “a uniforme 
distinct and proper being” to every creature.10 But “uniforme distinct and 
proper” is not the same as “fixed and stable.” Whereas the second set of 
terms implies that change is impossible (an ontological claim), the first set 
of terms implies only that change is imprudent (an ethical claim). Neither 
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Barish nor Levine is mindful of this difference, but it remains meaningful 
nonetheless.11 Attending to it allows us to achieve a more precise under-
standing of antitheatrical discourse. Specifically, it enables us to see that 
when antitheatrical authors insist upon the propriety and distinctness 
of our divinely ordained identities, they are not claiming that we can-
not change who we are but only that we cannot do so without risking 
condemnation (for who are we to second-guess God, trying to alter or 
improve upon his omniscient assignments?). far from supposing the self 
to be immutable or inalterable, the antitheatricalists are well aware that it 
can be fashioned and refashioned. This is precisely why the dissimulative 
practices of the theaters are so dangerous. Such being the case, the anti-
theatricalists stress the importance of divinely ordained identities—not to 
say that these are fixed and stable but only to say that it would be good if 
they were.12
Similarly, the antitheatricalists do not necessarily contradict them-
selves when they imply that human beings are inherently womanish, 
monstrous, and beastly, all at the same time. To a modern reader, these 
categories might seem disparate or mutually exclusive—so much so 
that the antitheatricalists’ failure to distinguish between them appears 
utterly nonsensical. To an early modern Englishman, though, those who 
are comprehended within these various categories are more or less alike 
in their collective incontinence. Lacking the self-restraint and integrity 
that are associated throughout the period with men and manliness, they 
are equivalently, even interchangeably, “unmanly.” In other words, the 
 antitheatricalists do not contradict themselves when they say that each of 
us is inherently womanish, monstrous, and beastly because each of these 
terms can indicate roughly the same thing—namely, a state of appetitive 
sensuality that is imagined to be the opposite of idealized manhood.13
But even if this is true, how can the self be inherently monstrous 
and womanish if it is also supposed to be inherently empty? for 
Levine, this is highly problematic. She contends that the subjective 
model put forward by the antitheatricalists is “profoundly contradic-
tory, for, according to its logic, the self is both inherently monstrous 
and inherently nothing at all” (12). Levine’s objection that selves can-
not be something and nothing would seem to be axiomatic. Yet we 
might wonder whether the objection applies in this instance, inas-
much as the antitheatricalists tend not to regard “unmanly” conditions 
like effeminacy or monstrousness as positive states but as negative 
ones characterized by absence and lack (e.g., no phallus, no reason, 
no restraint, no virtue). This is a sexist construction, to be sure, but 
it does much to dissolve the dichotomy of something/nothing. When 
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manliness is equated with plenitude and presence, it stands to reason 
that  anything and everything “unmanly” would tend toward noth-
ingness. Contextualized in this manner, the antitheatrical claim that 
selves are inherently empty and inherently monstrous is not so much 
illogical as apposite, for monstrousness is itself a kind of emptiness: a 
condition of critical lack that is antithetical to the “manly” attributes 
of presence, prudence, and perfection.
This conceptualization is firmly grounded in early modern sexism but 
also has roots in early modern theology, particularly the Augustinian idea 
that sin has no ontological status of its own but is merely the absence of 
good. According to this formulation, sin is not a something but a noth-
ing, which quite clearly impinges on the question at hand. If the antithe-
atricalists envision monstrousness as a state of sinful licentiousness and 
understand sinfulness to be a state of moral vacuity, then they need not 
embrace irrationality to imply that the self is simultaneously monstrous 
and empty. In both instances, what is being indicated is an absence of 
virtue and restraint. Were we to put it syllogistically, we might clarify the 
logic as follows:
To be monstrous = to be sinful
To be sinful = to be empty
∴ To be monstrous = to be empty
When considered alongside the theological notion that sin is a nothing or 
a negation, the antitheatrical allegation that audience members are both 
empty and monstrous begins to look a lot less contradictory.
The turn to theology can also ease another apparent contradiction 
in antitheatrical discourse—namely, the idea that stage plays can make 
audience members both too active and too passive, all volition and no 
 volition, as Levine puts it. Though Levine contends that these two condi-
tions are antithetical, they amount to much the same thing when one is 
of the orthodox opinion that the self is split between a carnal component 
and a spiritual component, each with a will of its own. To think along 
these lines is to see the will of the flesh perpetually warring against the 
will of the spirit, which is a conflict that produces the problem of too 
much and too little. If it is true that stage plays excite the carnal will and 
enfeeble the spiritual will, then those who attend plays would of course be 
rendered too active and too passive: too active in pursuing sinful pleasure 
and too passive in resisting it. These same audience members would also 
exhibit too much volition and too little volition: too much as concerns the 
depraved carnal will and too little as concerns the upright spiritual will. 
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Strictly speaking, such a construction might qualify as incoherent, but its 
incoherence springs from the metaphysical duality of the human subject, 
not the irrationality of the antitheatricalists. Although the antitheatrical-
ists bounce back and forth between all volition and no volition, this is not 
because they are unthinking extremists but because they are committed 
Christian dualists.
Once we come to terms with the Christian dualism of the antitheatrical-
ists, we become capable of seeing reason where others have seen unreason, 
as in Anthony Munday’s paradoxical assertion that stage plays can bring 
men “to like euen those whome of them-selues they abhor.”14 for Levine, 
such a claim makes no sense. To believe that the theater can  co-opt one’s 
desires so completely, she contends, one must resort to “ magical thinking” 
and regard the playhouse as a place of enchantment where patrons are 
transformed into “puppets” or “passive will-less robots” (12). However, 
the idea that one might be attracted to what one abhors is at least as much 
biblical as it is magical. The apostle Paul speaks of this very thing in his 
epistle to the Romans, remarking that “the good that I would I do not: but 
the evil which I would not, that I do,” and “that which I do I allow not: 
for what I would, that do I not; but what I hate, that do I.”15 Paul’s point, 
however, is not that he is a passive, will-less robot but that he is a car-
nally minded man, “sold under sin.”16 Torn between the righteous desires 
of his mind and the wicked desires of his flesh, he is unable to walk a 
straight line: “[W]ith the mind I myself serve the law of God; but with 
the flesh the law of sin.”17 Munday’s susceptible spectators are in the same 
 situation—which means that bewitchment is not the only way of account-
ing for the perversions of the playhouse. In order to get us to act against 
our own better judgment, playmakers do not need to strip away our will 
in some mysterious, supernatural fashion. They simply need to activate 
the illicit desires that are already inside us, causing these illicit desires to 
overpower our nobler impulses. Insofar as Munday portrays playmakers 
as doing just that, he does not ravel himself in magical thought so much 
as he rehearses a recognizably Protestant phenomenology of temptation.
Nevertheless, we must go further if we are to exonerate fully the anti-
theatricalists from the charge of “magical thinking,” for Levine sees them 
as pointing to not one but two magical processes. In the first process, 
watching leads inevitably to doing, such that audience members compul-
sively imitate the actions they see on stage. In the second process, watch-
ing leads inevitably to being, such that audience members assume the 
identity of the actor before them, quite literally becoming another person. 
Calling this second process “the deeper belief in magic,” Levine attempts 
to prove its prevalence in antitheatrical polemic by quoting a passage 
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from  Playes  Confuted (1582) wherein Gosson reproduces Xenophon’s 
account of a  production of Bacchus and Ariadne:
When Bacchus rose up, tenderly lifting Ariadne from her 
seate, no small store of curtesie passing betwene them, 
the beholders rose up, every man stoode on tippe toe, and 
seemed to hover over the playe, when they sware, the com-
pany sware, when they departed to bedde; the company 
presently was set on fire, they that were married posted 
home to their wives; they that were single, vowed very 
solemly, to be wedded.18
According to Levine, the formulaic repetitions in this passage (rising up, 
standing on tiptoe, swearing oaths) imply that the mind of the actor is 
impressed upon each onlooker in such a way that “the spectator quite 
literally takes on the identity of the actor” (13). “If we are to understand 
such anecdotes,” Levine writes, “we shall have to account for the irratio-
nal idea that one person could be changed into another” (14).
In order to see this passage as asserting a magical transformation, how-
ever, we must follow Levine in equating affective state with identity, imag-
ining that anyone who feels sexual stirrings similar to those being felt by 
some other person has literally become that other person. Such a belief is 
extreme, and I do not see the passage as endorsing it. Although the specta-
tors here have clearly become aroused, there is little to support the claim 
that they have assumed new or different identities because each seeks to 
satisfy himself or herself in the manner most suited to his or her real-life 
situation, prior to and apart from the performance: those who are married 
go home to their spouses, and those who are single resolve to marry. Had 
any of these individuals actually become Bacchus, only Ariadne would 
have fit the bill—and heaven help the poor actor who would have been 
forced to fend off an entire audience, each member pursuing him in the 
name and person of Bacchus. Of course, things do not fall out this way. 
These onlookers have not become Bacchus; they have merely become as 
aroused as they suppose Bacchus to have been. Once again, Levine mis-
represents the antitheatrical argument by making it more literal and more 
sensational than it actually is.
This is not to say that antitheatrical discourse should never be read 
literally. To be sure, there is more in it than metaphor. When Stephen 
Gosson, for instance, advises that “[t]he Poetes that write playes, and they 
that present them vpon the Stage, studie to make our affections ouerflow,” 
the association he makes between emotions and fluidity is more than just 
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figurative.19 This much is clear when Gosson’s claims are situated within 
a humoral context. As Gail Kern Paster has shown, the humoral theories 
that prevailed in the early modern period posited the passions to be closely 
and functionally associated with the four bodily humors—so much so 
that the passions were not merely considered to be analogous to the liquid 
states and fluid forces of nature but were actually taken to be liquid forces 
of nature in their own right, operating within the body just as the forces 
of wind and waves operate in the natural world.20 Seen from this angle, 
Gosson’s propensity to talk about the playhouse as a place of dangerous 
fluidity acquires an unexpectedly literal dimension. He is not just wax-
ing poetic when he warns that stage plays can carry us beyond our depth 
on deadly currents of passion and desire. Underlying all his references 
to unruly waves, overwhelming floods, and gaping gulfs is a material, 
humoral reality.21 This, then, is one area in which a literalistic approach 
strikes me as both plausible and productive. If we really want to take the 
antitheatricalists at their word, I submit that we should focus less on the 
idea that stage plays can anatomically effeminate us and more on the claim 
that they can make us overflow.
Yet the humoral framework that Paster has painstakingly recon-
structed can shed even more light on antitheatrical discourse inasmuch 
as it effectively normalizes the antitheatricalists’ fears regarding the sus-
ceptibility of spectators subjected to the sights and sounds of the play-
houses. As Paster’s work helps us see, such fears are wholly consonant 
with a humoral conceptualization of the self. The humoral self is char-
acterized by extreme corporeal porosity and openness, which in turn 
translates into a high degree of emotional volatility and instability. A 
post-Enlightenment enthusiasm for rational choice and self-restraint is 
entirely anachronistic to this model of the self, for the continual fluxes 
and flows experienced by the humoral subject were understood to be so 
strong and unceasing as to prevent the force of reason from encompass-
ing or even adequately accounting for individual behavior. As Paster 
remarks, adherents of humoralism were bound to take psychophysiol-
ogy seriously and to call for external social disciplines because this was 
part and parcel of “their governing paradigm for theorizing the bodily 
wellsprings of human behavior.”22 from a humoral perspective, the anti-
theatrical view that internal dispositions and outward actions are highly 
susceptible to—even determined by—one’s situation and surroundings 
makes a great deal of sense.
These ideas are also congruent with the period’s philosophies and 
physiologies of perception. As Stephanie Shirilan has observed, the open-
ness and porosity of the early modern self is not only a humoral condition; 
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early modern faculty psychology also constructed the self as open and 
impressionable. Theorists of cognition often tied this susceptibility to the 
operation and influence of the imaginative faculties, which were thought 
capable of forging sympathetic identifications so strong as to collapse 
the distance between self and other. However, these sympathetic links 
were not without a material basis, as well, since all bodies were believed 
to be physically connected, communicating with one another through a 
common medium animated by spirit or pneuma. As a result of all this 
interconnectedness, interpersonal transference was almost inevitable, and 
writers ranging from Robert Burton to francis Bacon marvel at the ease 
with which somatic experience is sympathetically and mimetically passed 
from one individual to another—as when one man yawns and another 
follows suit or when one man urinates and a second is provoked to do the 
same. According to Shirilan, early modern cognitive psychology clearly 
fosters the belief that performed bodily symptoms can “[infect] the per-
ceiver with the impulse to reproduce the observed behaviour—regardless 
of the authenticity of this witnessed performance.”23 Such a supposition, 
it must be acknowledged, is the antitheatrical argument in a nutshell. 
Consequently, it cannot be said that the antitheatricalists are alone in 
imagining that playacting might prove both contagious and corrupting. 
In the early modern period, the antitheatrical perspective on the power of 
performance, the malleability of the self, and the weakness of the will is 
consistent with current scientific models.
Of course, an early modern Englishman need not have specialized 
knowledge of faculty psychology, Galenic humoralism, or Paracelsian 
pneumatism to entertain the idea that one could be overtaken or corrupted 
by external influences, even when unwilling. During this time of plague 
and contagion, as Carla Mazzio observes, infection was a constant worry, 
with each new affliction or outbreak offering a frightening reminder of 
one’s own susceptibility. The all-too-easy transference of disease from one 
person to the next readily confirmed that one could be touched at a dis-
tance, fatally compromised by exposure to unwholesome sights, sounds, 
and smells.24 This corporeal vulnerability, in turn, came to betoken spiri-
tual and moral vulnerabilities of the same order. As Margaret Healy 
shows, early modern efforts to ascertain how syphilis and the plague were 
communicated led to analogous speculations about less tangible trans-
ferences. When malignant qualities of an airy or material nature were 
understood to be invisibly transmitted and insensibly incorporated, it 
stood to reason that the same would happen with moral, spiritual, and 
psychological qualities. far from being figurative, these types of trans-
ferences were regarded as real phenomena. As Healy writes, “[P]sychic 
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and moral ‘touching’ was a particular preoccupation of the late sixteenth 
and the first half of the seventeenth century,” not only rendered plausible 
but also empirically sanctioned by the passage of plague contagion.25 Such 
preoccupations, it should be apparent, both undergird and uphold the 
antitheatrical idea that entire assemblies can be infected by eloquent or 
affecting performances. In many ways, early modern antitheatricalism is 
a logical extension and application of early modern epidemiologies.
from this follows my contention that the antitheatricalists’ concerns 
about the corrupting influence of the theater are of a piece with prevail-
ing early modern paradigms. Their ideas about the self and its suscepti-
bilities are not so much paranoid as Protestant, not so much abnormal as 
empirical. Notwithstanding our tendency to portray the antitheatrical-
ists as outliers, many of the distinctions we would draw between those 
who attack the stage and those who defend it are difficult to maintain. 
As Peter Lake perceptively notes, the antitheatricalists and the apologists 
not only invoke “the same moralizing and providential frameworks” but 
also share “core structuring assumptions” about such things as “order and 
disorder, providence, sin and the devil, social and gender hierarchy and 
subordination, vice, virtue and the good death.”26
With respect to this overlap, it is useful to set Sir Philip Sidney alongside 
Stephen Gosson, considering the foremost Elizabethan apologist in conjunc-
tion with one of the period’s most prominent antipoetic authors. The com-
parison is somewhat natural, since Sidney apparently intended his Apology 
for Poetrie (1595) as a refutation of Gosson’s Schoole of Abuse (1579),27 yet one 
of the curiosities of Sidney’s treatise is the way it ends up endorsing many 
of the assumptions and arguments found in Gosson’s work. Like Gosson, 
Sidney declares the right use of poetry to be the inculcation of valor and 
courage. Like Gosson, Sidney asserts poetry’s power to make things memo-
rable, immediate, and attractive. And, like Gosson, Sidney maintains that 
poetry appeals to the senses and passions so powerfully as to move us—
almost irresistibly—to perform actions we would otherwise avoid. Taking 
all of this into account, it is hard to quarrel with Jacob Bronowski’s claim 
that “Sidney’s theory of poetry and Gosson’s are the same.”28
The common ground, however, extends beyond this, for Sidney 
expresses agreement not only with Gosson’s general theory of poetry 
but also with a number of his particular accusations. Speaking of the 
comedies currently performed in England, Sidney openly admits that 
“naughty playmakers and stagekeepers have justly made [them]  odious.”29 
Elsewhere, he allows that the tragedies and comedies presented on the 
professional stage are “not without cause cried out against.”30 And in per-
haps the most damning concession of all, Sidney says, “I yield that poesy 
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may not only be abused, but that being abused, by the reason of his sweet 
charming force, it can do more hurt than any other army of words.”31 
In the Apology, Sidney will attempt to finesse this point by insisting that 
poetry’s potential for good outweighs its potential for bad, but before 
long Sidney seems to have backed away from this optimistic appraisal. 
Although Sidney died about five years after finishing the Apology, even 
this short span appears to have been sufficient for him to think better 
of his apologetic enthusiasm. According to his early biographers, Sidney 
became so troubled by the immoral possibilities of his own writings that 
he eventually desired to destroy them. Thomas Moffet relates that, in his 
later years Sidney “[came] to fear . . . that his Stella [1591] and his Arcadia 
[1590] might render the souls of readers more yielding instead of better” 
and therefore wished to have them burned. Similarly, fulke Greville 
reports that Sidney grew certain that the beauty of his prose romance, The 
Arcadia, “was more apt to allure men to evil than to frame any goodness 
in them” and consequently “bequeathed no other legacy but the fire to 
this unpolished embryo.”32 This trajectory is not unlike Gosson’s, another 
poet who became increasingly uncomfortable with poetry’s allure and 
ultimately concluded it would be better to go without its pleasures than 
undergo its temptations. Though antitheatricalism is supposed to be the 
pathological position, it is worth noting that the preeminent apologist of 
the era appears to have moved in that direction as he matured.
This is not to say that Sidney and Gosson are indistinguishable. They 
clearly diverge in a number of ways.33 But when it comes to  overarching 
theories—about poetry, imagination, and the fallen will—they align 
more closely than we often admit. To recognize this is to begin to see that 
we cannot entirely account for early modern antitheatricalism by alleg-
ing that its proponents were paranoid. Yet, if this is the case, how can 
we explain the popularity of the professional stage? If most English men 
and women shared the core structuring assumptions of the antitheatrical 
authors, why did so many ignore their counsel? The answer, I believe, 
has more to do with risk assessment and risk tolerance than anything else. 
I submit that the majority of early moderns would have acknowledged 
the moral dangers of playgoing as readily as we moderns acknowledge 
the physical dangers of motorcycling or skydiving. In such pursuits, what 
separates the participant from the nonparticipant is not a set of differ-
ing ideologies so much as variable evaluations of the activity’s pleasures 
and benefits, relative to its risks. I do not think early modern playgoers 
imagined that they were safe from harm—only that the risks they were 
running were acceptable and/or manageable. In this sense, what sets the 
antitheatricalist apart is an abundance of caution, not an absence of reason.
246 KENT R. LEHNHOf
If we continue to equate antitheatricalism with insanity, however, we 
obscure the acute moral problems playacting posed in Shakespeare’s day. 
We also give short shrift to a rather rich set of texts. Men like Munday, 
Gosson, and Stubbes can tell us a great deal about the early modern 
stage, if only we take them seriously. To date, a handful of critics have 
endeavored to do this, and their analyses have been both rewarding 
and revelatory. Ágnes Matuska, for instance, has conscientiously con-
sidered why antitheatrical authors do not allow that one could be a 
chaste onlooker—that one could remain unaffected by a given act or 
performance by choosing not to participate in or approve it. Rather than 
dismiss the idea as absurd, Matuska uses it to think through early mod-
ern staging practices, particularly those that recruit or require audience 
involvement. What emerges from this analysis is a better understanding 
of the uniquely participatory nature of the early modern playhouse.34 
David Hawkes, for his part, has read the antitheatricalists alongside 
Marx, concluding that they are not cranks but insightful cultural crit-
ics, perceiving better than most the consequences of commercializing 
the theaters and commodifying their offerings. As Hawkes shows, the 
opponents of the stage offer “a coherent and sophisticated critique of 
the ideological and psychological effects of a commodity culture.”35 
finally, Bryan Reynolds has seriously entertained the antitheatrical 
claims either disregarded or derided by critics like Stephen Greenblatt, 
Jean Howard, and Laura Levine—and has subsequently developed one 
of the most sophisticated and compelling accounts of the early modern 
theater. According to Reynolds, antitheatrical writers were right on 
many fronts, for the early modern playhouse really was an exceptional 
cultural apparatus, capable of cultivating a unique form of deviance 
that Reynolds calls “transversality.” Reynolds persuasively argues—in 
agreement with antitheatrical polemic—that the early modern stage 
was a supremely powerful sociopolitical conductor, radiating transver-
sal power in such a way that “everyone exposed to the public theater’s 
efflorescing reach, including its most fervent enemies, was infected with 
transversal thought.”36
As valuable as these “nonpathological” readings have proven to 
be, they remain relatively rare, overshadowed by the received notion 
that the antitheatricalists are irrational. In this essay, I have sought to 
contest this characterization by carefully parsing the antitheatricalists’ 
claims and by showing that these claims are of a piece with humoral 
theory, faculty psychology, Protestant theology, and early modern 
lived experienced. Assuredly, one need not fear magic, monsters, or 
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vanishing penises to worry about the effects of the stage: these wor-
ries were straightforwardly indicated by the prevailing worldview. To 
believe in original sin and the fallen will, to believe in the passions and 
the humors, to believe in the powers of sympathy and imagination—to 
believe in any or all of these early modern orthodoxies—is to know, at 
some level, that the antitheatricalists have reason, that playhouses can be 
perilous places, indeed.
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1. Google Scholar (accessed 4 November 2016, scholar.google.com) records no fewer than 
1,196 citations of Jonas Barish’s The Antitheatrical Prejudice and 292 citations of Laura 
Levine’s Men in Women’s Clothing. To put this latter figure in perspective, it is worth 
noting that out of all the single-authored literary critical studies of early modern 
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sixteen times in the chapter. No other English moralist is directly quoted more than five 
times (Table 2).
3. Barish, Antitheatrical Prejudice, 84, 86, 87; hereafter cited parenthetically in the text.
4. Laura Levine, Men in Women’s Clothing: Anti-theatricality and Effeminization, 1579–1642, 
Cambridge Studies in Renaissance Literature and Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge 
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5. Stephen Gosson, The Schoole of Abuse (London: Thomas Woodcocke, 1579), sigs.  
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terms like “manly” are still being used to describe moral states, apart from  anatomical 
ones. In a document no less central than the Declaration of Independence, the US 
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